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RULES, STANDARDS, AND GEEKS 
Derek E. Bambauer* 
INTRODUCTION 
When it comes to regulating technology, the age-old debate between 
rules and standards tilts heavily towards standards. Rules, for all their 
clarity, are seen as slow-changing tools in industries characterized by 
dynamism. They are also viewed as being both under- and over-inclusive, 
and in prizing form—one means of achieving a desired result—over 
substance—the result itself.1 Moreover, setting legal rules for technology 
risks creating lock-in, which may cement a given technology in place. In 
short, standards—particularly standards that look to industry best 
practices—are lauded as the best means for governing code through law.2 
This Article, though, argues that rules are preferable for regulating data 
security, at least under certain conditions. In part, this is so because data 
security typically focuses on controlling the wrong set of events. Security is 
often preoccupied with regulating access to data—in particular, with 
preventing unauthorized access.3 Yet, strangely, unauthorized access is 
ubiquitous. Employees lose laptops,4 hackers breach corporate databases,5 
and information is inadvertently e-mailed6 or posted to the public Internet.7 
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WASH. & LEE L. REV. 49 (2007). 
 2. See, e.g., Daniel Gervais, The Regulation of Inchoate Technologies, 47 HOUS. L. REV. 665, 
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Breach Prevention Strategies, INS. J. (Apr. 27, 2009), http://www.insurancejournal.com/news/ 
national/2009/04/27/99982.htm. 
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N.C.), Sept. 25, 2009, http://www.news-record.com/content/2009/09/25/article/hacker_hits_unc_ 
chapel_hill_study_data. 
 6. E.g., David Hendricks, KCI Working to Contain Employee Data Breach, SAN ANTONIO 
EXPRESS-NEWS, Sept. 3, 2010, at C1; Sara Cunningham, Bullitt School Employees’ Social 
Security Numbers Mistakenly Released, THE COURIER-J. (Louisville, Ky.), Oct. 21, 2009. 
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Apr. 29, 2010, http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2010/04/29/opinion/main6445904.shtml; Elinor 
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This Article argues that preventing data breaches is not only the wrong goal 
for regulators, it is an impossible one. Complex systems design theory 
shows that accidents are inevitable.8 Thus, instead of seeking to prevent 
crashes, policymakers should concentrate on enabling us to walk away from 
them. The focus should be on airbags, not anti-lock brakes. Regulation 
should seek to allow data to “degrade gracefully,” mitigating the harm that 
occurs when a breach (inevitably) happens.9 
Such regulatory methods are optimally framed as rules under three 
conditions. First, minimal compliance—meeting only the letter of the law—
is sufficient to avoid most harm. Second, rules should be relatively 
impervious to decay in efficacy over time; technological change, such as 
increased CPU speeds, should not immediately undermine a rule’s 
preventive impact.10 Furthermore, compliance with a rule should be easy 
and inexpensive to evaluate. In addition, rules are likely to be helpful where 
error costs from standards are high; where if an entity’s judgment about 
data security is wrong, there is significant risk of harm or risk of significant 
harm. Finally, this argument has implications for how compliance should be 
assessed. When regulation is clear and low-cost, it creates an excellent case 
for a per se negligence rule, or, in other words, a regime of strict liability for 
failure to comply with the rule. This Article thus addresses not the 
desirability of regulation—when data security should be mandated—but 
rather how to structure that regulation once it is deemed worthwhile. 
The debate about framing legal commands as rules or as standards is a 
venerable one. Scholars have addressed the dichotomy in contexts from real 
property rights11 to patent law12 to antitrust.13 The merits and shortcomings 
of each approach have been analyzed from a variety of theoretical 
perspectives.14 Rules offer clearer signals to those whose behavior is 
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 9. See Gariel & Feron, supra note 8, at 2029–32; see also MARK GRAFF & KENNETH R. VAN 
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CPU doubles every two years. Michael Kanellos, Prospective: Myths of Moore’s Law, CNET 
NEWS (June 11, 2003, 4:00 AM), http://news.cnet.com/Myths-of-Moores-Law/2010-1071_3-1014 
887.html. 
 11. See Carol M. Rose, Crystals and Mud in Property Law, 40 STAN. L. REV. 577, 580 (1988). 
 12. See Duffy, supra note 1, at 611. 
 13. See Crane, supra note 1, at 52. 
 14. See, e.g., Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 
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REV. 22 (1992); Cass R. Sunstein, Problems with Rules, 83 CALIF. L. REV. 953 (1995). 
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constrained; they help both regulated and regulators assess compliance 
more cheaply and easily.15 In addition, they may prevent abuse by 
conferring less discretion on regulators.16 However, rules are often under-
inclusive—failing to cover behavior that should fall within their ambit, or 
failing to prevent risks they are designed to address—or over-inclusive—
imposing burdens on unrelated actors or activities.17 Standards, by contrast, 
are more readily adapted to complex or changing situations, but often at the 
price of predictability and cost.18 
The discussion becomes more complex when we recognize that the 
distinction is continuous rather than binary. Standards can be rule-like, and 
rules standards-like. Consider two security mandates: “encrypt,” and 
“follow industry best practice for securing data.” The former looks like a 
rule, and the latter like a standard. However, “encrypt” could be seen as a 
standard: the command specifies a method, but leaves the implementation 
entirely up to the regulated entity. Encryption has been used since the days 
of Mary, Queen of Scots;19 its modes range from simple (and simply 
cracked) transposition ciphers20 to elliptic curve cryptography.21 Even a 
more specific command like “encrypt using asymmetric key cryptography” 
can be met with a variety of responses. The RSA, ElGamal, and DSS key 
techniques all meet the criterion, but have important differences among 
them.22 Thus, a rule can be transformed into a standard by altering the level 
of specificity. 
Similarly, “follow industry best practice for securing data” could be a 
rule. If, for example, the industry has standardized on the use of SSL 
(Secure Sockets Layer) to safeguard sensitive data while it is being 
communicated over a network, that best practice standard effectively 
becomes a rule: “use SSL.”23 Thus, even if an alternative technique were 
demonstrated to be functionally equivalent, it would not comply with the 
standard, even though standards are typically viewed as ends-driven and not 
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 19. SIMON SINGH, THE CODE BOOK 32–39 (1999). 
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(Kenneth H. Rosen ed., 2003); Taher Elgamal, A Public Key Cryptosystem and a Signature 
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SYSTEMS (2001).  
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means-driven. In short, the line between rules and standards blurs, 
particularly as a rule’s command becomes more general. 
The Article next assesses the conventional wisdom for technological 
regulation, which holds that standards are the preferred modality. It then 
turns to arguments in favor of using rules instead, under certain defined 
conditions. Finally, it closes with observations about the larger role of 
technology regulation in the context of data security in the payment system. 
I. THE VIRTUES OF STANDARDS 
Technology changes quickly; law, slowly. Most commentators favor 
standards when dealing with technological regulation of issues such as 
security, for at least five reasons. 
First, standards allow regulated entities to comply in a more cost-
efficient fashion than rules. Requiring a particular technology or approach 
may be unnecessarily expensive, especially where infrastructures differ 
significantly, where there are a range of alternatives, or where the endpoint 
can be achieved without applying technology in some situations.24 Rules 
can limit creativity in achieving regulators’ goals.25 
Second, standards can be less vulnerable to obsolescence. Rule-based 
specifications may decay quickly when technology changes rapidly. This 
either undercuts the efficacy of regulation, or forces frequent updates to it. 
The Clipper Chip controversy of the mid-1990s provides a potent example; 
regulation that mandated use of one particular encryption technique might 
well have undercut the deployment of e-commerce and other advances 
dependent on data security.26 
Third, standards can minimize the ill-effects of information asymmetry 
regarding technology.27 Regulators may not know what technologies are 
cutting-edge or appropriate or unnecessarily costly. Standards can wrap in 
expertise from regulated entities while meeting regulatory goals. 
Fourth, standards may deal better with interoperability concerns. Most 
organizations have heterogeneous information technology environments for 
a variety of reasons: mergers, legacy systems, customer demands, and so 
forth. Regulations that specify a particular technology, or method of 
compliance, may make demands that are impossible or inapposite. For 
example, Deutsche Bank used the IBM operating system OS/2 long after 
                                                                                                                 
 24. Cf. Christopher S. Yoo, Network Neutrality, Consumers, and Innovation, 2008 U. CHI. 
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2010] Rules, Standards, and Geeks 53 
most other customers had migrated to Microsoft Windows or a UNIX 
platform.28 Thus, requirements tied to Windows (for example, using the 
NTFS file system) or to software only available for that operating system 
would have forced Deutsche Bank into a costly migration, or to fall out of 
compliance. In contrast, a standard that specifies its goal, but is technology-
agnostic, allows entities with a range of infrastructures to comply 
adequately. 
Finally, selecting one technology for regulatory compliance risks 
producing market-making effects. Regulation may confer success, or at 
least widespread adoption, on a single product or company—a problem that 
worsens if the technology is sub-optimal. For example, the memory chip 
manufacturer Rambus was able to influence the industry group JEDEC 
(Joint Electron Device Engineering Counsel) to adopt, as part of its 
standard for SDRAM (Synchronous Dynamic Random Access Memory), 
technology over which Rambus held patent rights.29 (Indeed, Rambus 
actually amended its pending patent applications to conform better to the 
JEDEC technology.)30 This led to lawsuits against Rambus for fraud, and to 
an initial Federal Trade Commission (FTC, or Commission) finding that the 
company had engaged in antitrust violations (under Section 2 of the 
Sherman Act).31 However, Rambus emerged unscathed from both the suits 
and the FTC investigation.32 Similarly, a legal mandate to incorporate a 
particular technology could create market power for that technology’s 
owner, particularly if the technology were protected by intellectual property 
rights such as a patent. Thus, a rule may entrench a single technology into a 
powerful if not unassailable market position. 
The use of standards in technology regulation is a familiar aspect of the 
data payment system in the United States. For example, the FTC imposed 
standards-based requirements for the security of non-public information, 
known as the Safeguards Rule, as part of its rulemaking authority under the 
Gramm-Leach-Bliley (GLB) Act.33 The Commission mandates a 
“comprehensive information security program that is written in one or more 
                                                                                                                 
 28. Jonathan Collins, IBM Steps Up to Blame Microsoft for OS/2 Failure, COMPUTERGRAM 
INT’L (Nov. 18, 1998), http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0CGN/is_3541/ai_53238418. 
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 30. Id. 
 31. Edward Iwata, Rambus Stock Soars 24% After Antitrust Ruling by FTC; Royalties Capped, 
Not Killed, USA TODAY, Feb. 6, 2007, at B3. 
 32. Austin Modine, FTC Drops Rambus ‘Patent Ambush’ Claims, CHANNEL REGISTER (May 
14, 2009), http://www.channelregister.co.uk/2009/05/14/ftc_drops_rambus_antitrust_case; see 
also Dean Wilson, Rambus Sues IBM to Reverse Patent Ruling, TECHEYE (Aug. 24, 2010, 3:21 
PM), http://www.techeye.net/business/rambus-sues-ibm-to-reverse-patent-ruling. 
 33. Standards for Safeguarding Customer Information, 67 Fed. Reg. 36,484 (May 23, 2002) 
(to be codified at 16 C.F.R. pt. 314). 
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readily accessible parts and contains administrative, technical, and physical 
safeguards that are appropriate to [an organization’s] size and complexity, 
the nature and scope of its activities, and the sensitivity of any customer 
information at issue.”34 Regulated entities must perform a risk assessment, 
and then “[d]esign and implement information safeguards to control the 
risks [it] identif[ies] through risk assessment, and regularly test or otherwise 
monitor the effectiveness of the safeguards’ key controls, systems, and 
procedures.”35 Thus, the GLB Act is a purposive regulatory standard: it sets 
goals, and identifies key areas and targets, but is method-agnostic. Financial 
institutions can implement its requirements using the technology they think 
best fits their infrastructures and businesses. The Commission’s final 
rulemaking emphasized that the “standard is highly flexible,” and the notice 
repeatedly reassured regulated institutions that its approach was fact-
specific and contextual.36 
Indeed, there are zones of regulatory concern regarding payment data 
security where standards appear superior. One example is application 
design. As I have written elsewhere, both custom-designed and off-the-shelf 
applications in the payment system suffer from security flaws.37 Some of 
these bugs result from coding errors; others, from the inherent complexity 
of data processing and from interactions between systems and data stores.38 
As Microsoft’s Patch Tuesday ritual reminds us, bugs are inevitable.39 They 
can be minimized, but not eliminated.40 Thus, as with data losses and 
security breaches themselves, the best regulatory goal for application design 
is to minimize bugs.41 Software design involves the familiar trade-off 
between time and cost versus greater security, with a minimum optimal 
bugginess greater than zero. 
For application design, then, the critical regulatory issue is 
methodology: setting parameters for the design, testing, and deployment of 
the software.42 Again, this approach is familiar to the payment industry. The 
Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard (PCI DSS) Requirements 
and Security Assessment Standards, promulgated by an industry association 
founded by payment card networks such as American Express, create 
                                                                                                                 
 34. Id. at 36,494. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. at 36,488. 
 37. Derek E. Bambauer & Oliver Day, The Hacker’s Aegis, 60 EMORY L.J. (forthcoming 
2010) (manuscript at 8). 
 38. See generally id. at 8–10. 
 39. Microsoft Security Bulletin Advance Notification, MICROSOFT, 
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SOFTWARE ENGINEERING (3rd prtg. 1979). 
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private law regulation of customer account data.43 To comply with PCI 
DSS, an organization must develop its software applications in accordance 
with the DSS standards, and with industry best practices. Requirements 
include validating application input to prevent buffer overflow and cross-
site scripting (CSS) attacks, checking error handling, validating encrypted 
storage, validating communications security, and checking role-based 
access controls.44 Organizations must implement code review for custom 
software before deploying applications.45 Public Web applications are 
subject to additional standards, such as developing based on the Open Web 
Application Security Project Guide, and protecting against newly 
discovered vulnerabilities by using a firewall or vulnerability assessment 
tools.46 The goal of these requirements is to prevent breaches from common 
attacks, such as the SQL injection attack that caused the data spill at 
Heartland Payment Systems.47 
PCI DSS, as its moniker suggests, is framed as a standard and not as a 
rule. This is clear from its focus on process, such as engaging in code 
review, and on goals, such as protecting against new attacks or 
vulnerabilities. Thus, for example, PCI DSS requires validating secure 
communications, not using a particular secure communications technology 
such as SSL.48 Application design is a sensible target for standards-based 
regulation, for at least three reasons. First, history matters. Most financial 
institutions maintain legacy systems, such as mainframe-based applications, 
due to the cost and difficulty of upgrading.49 It may be impossible for them 
to employ a given technology to achieve security without expensive 
wholesale changes to their infrastructure. Second, systems heterogeneity 
means that even applications with a common goal, such as connecting to 
                                                                                                                 
 43. See generally PCI SCC Data Security Standards Overview, PCI SEC. STANDARD 
COUNCIL, https://www.pcisecuritystandards.org/security_standards/index.php (last visited Dec. 
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 44. PCI SECURITY STANDARDS COUNCIL, PAYMENT CARD INDUSTRY (PCI) DATA SECURITY 
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 45. Id. at 32. 
 46. Id. at 33. 
 47. Julia S. Cheney, Heartland Payment Systems: Lessons Learned from a Data Breach 3–5 
(Fed. Reserve Bank of Phila., Discussion Paper No. 10-1, 2010), available at 
http://www.philadelphiafed.org/payment-cards-center/publications/discussion-papers/2010/D-
2010-January-Heartland-Payment-Systems.pdf; Kim Zetter, TJX Hacker Charged with Heartland, 
Hannaford Breaches, WIRED (Aug. 17, 2009, 2:34 PM), http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2009/ 
08/tjx-hacker-charged-with-heartland. 
 48. PCI SECURITY PROCEDURES, supra note 44, at 31. 
 49. See, e.g., Sol E. Solomon, Legacy Systems Still in the Main Frame, ZDNET (Aug. 14, 
2008), http://www.zdnetasia.com/legacy-systems-still-in-the-main-frame-62044820.htm; Rusty 
Weston, Reconsider the Mainframe, SMART ENTER., http://www.smartenterprisemag.com/articles/ 
2008winter/markettrends.jhtml (last visited Dec. 30, 2010). 
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payment networks, likely must be custom-coded.50 Forcing financial 
institutions to use one technology or method to gain security ends would 
drive up their costs unnecessarily. Finally, here rule-based specifications 
seem more vulnerable to decay. New attacks and vulnerabilities appear 
constantly.51 Having a single approach to security across the financial 
industry may, like monoculture agriculture, leave institutions vulnerable to 
a single new pathogen.52 In short, security may well degrade rapidly, rather 
than slowly. For these three reasons—legacy systems, customized code, and 
rapid degradation—a standards-based regime is preferable to a rule-based 
one for application design. 
Regulation by standards rather than rules is the established norm in the 
data payment system.53 Indeed, as the discussion of application design 
demonstrates, this preference may be sensible in some areas. However, 
standards are not always superior. The next section explores the virtues of 
regulation by rules for security. 
II. THE VIRTUES OF RULES 
Arguing for rules in technological regulation is an uphill climb: they 
can become obsolete rapidly, may increase costs by forcing entities to 
comply in a highly specific fashion, and may be both over- and under-
inclusive. Yet, this Article argues that rules are preferable to standards 
when at least three conditions hold: sufficient minima, slow or low decay, 
and inexpensive verification. 
First, a rule is helpful when the specified level of data security—
effectively, a minimum—suffices in most or all circumstances. One 
example would be to mandate that transmission of data take place over a 
connection protected by 128-bit SSL.54 SSL certificates are widely and 
cheaply available, and root certificates are built into all major browsers.55 
Currently, 128-bit SSL traffic is proof against brute-force decryption 
attacks even when adversaries use clusters or supercomputers.56 Thus, 128-
bit encryption is strong enough to protect data in communication, even if 
                                                                                                                 
 50. HAZELINE ASUNCION & RICHARD N. TAYLOR, INST. FOR SOFTWARE RESEARCH, 
ESTABLISHING THE CONNECTION BETWEEN SOFTWARE TRACEABILITY AND DATA PROVENANCE 
10 (2007), available at http://www.isr.uci.edu/tech_reports/UCI-ISR-07-9.pdf. 
 51. See, e.g., SECUNIA, SECUNIA HALF YEAR REPORT (2010), available at http://secunia.com/ 
gfx/pdf/Secunia_Half_Year_Report_2010.pdf. 
 52. See generally DANIEL D. CHIRAS, ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCE 116 (8th ed. 2010). 
 53. See PCI SECURITY PROCEDURES, supra note 44. 
 54. See, e.g., Roy Schoenberg, Security of Healthcare Information Systems, in CONSUMER 
HEALTH INFORMATICS 162, 176 (Deborah Lewis et al., eds., 2005). 
 55. Id. 
 56. See, e.g., JOSEPH STEINBERG & TIM SPEED, SSL VPN: UNDERSTANDING, EVALUATING, 
AND PLANNING SECURE, WEB-BASED REMOTE ACCESS 33–67 (2005). 
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institutions do not take additional measures, such as protecting against 
eavesdropping.57  
A corollary is that rules may be helpful where the impact of a data 
breach is high, and where the specified technology raises the cost to an 
attacker or discoverer of captured information. One example here is hard 
drive encryption. Stories of lost laptops, backup tapes, and USB drives are 
legion. Here, rules serve not to prevent loss—indeed, hard drive encryption 
is only useful after the loss has taken place—but to reduce its effects.58 
Similarly, a rule mandating logging of access to sensitive data cannot 
prevent an employee from copying down customer account information 
displayed on a computer monitor, but can aid an institution to detect what 
has been revealed in the breach, and perhaps to minimize its spread.59 This 
condition requires that the rule specify protection that is good enough in 
most or all cases. 
Second, rules work well when they need not be frequently updated—in 
other words, when they decay slowly. This reduces the administrative cost 
of the rule, and allows it to retain effectiveness over time.60 128-bit 
encryption, for example, will likely suffice against brute-force attacks for at 
least ten years, given current rates of advance in CPU clock cycles and 
parallelization.61 To take another encryption case study, DES (Data 
Encryption Standard) was adopted as a Federal Information Processing 
Standard in 1976.62 It remained impervious to commercial-level decryption 
(as opposed to governmental attacks) until the late 1990s.63A technology-
                                                                                                                 
 57. “Man in the middle” attacks against SSL are still theoretically possible, but financial 
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Laws Reduce Identity Theft? 12 (Sept. 16, 2008) (unpublished manuscript), available at 
http://weis2008.econinfosec.org/papers/Romanosky.pdf; Robert Vamosi, Protect Data With On-
the-Go Drive Encryption, PCWORLD (Mar. 1, 2010, 9:00 PM), http://www.pcworld.com/article/ 
189034/protect_data_with_onthego_drive_encryption.html. 
 59. See, e.g., Sarah Cortes, Compliance Fundamentals: Database Logging, Privileged Access 
Control, IT COMPLIANCE ADVISOR (Apr. 13, 2009, 3:28 PM), http://itknowledgeexchange.tech 
target.com/it-compliance/compliance-fundamentals-database-logging-privileged-access-control. 
 60. Sunstein, supra note 14, at 1012–16. 
 61. See, e.g., Bradley Mitchell, Encryption: What is the Difference Between 40-bit and 128-bit 
Encryption?, ABOUT.COM, http://compnetworking.about.com/od/networksecurityprivacy/l/aa011 
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specifying rule that remains effective for over twenty years is relatively 
low-cost to update and relatively impervious to decay.64 
Finally, rules are particularly effective when monitoring is low-cost and 
accurate. An ongoing problem with data security breaches is the causation 
of downstream harm. For example, if a bank suffers a data spill, and its 
customers later suffer identity theft, is there a causal connection to the spill? 
Courts have largely interpreted the causation requirements built into tort 
law to exempt data owners or storehouses from liability.65 This may result 
in insufficient incentives to take precautions. A rule, for example, that 
requires data holders to encrypt data usefully serves as a bright-line 
negligence test—especially when compliance is relatively low-cost. 
Holding institutions responsible for downstream consequences of harms 
related to the spilled information provides strong incentives to comply with 
the rule—including that liability can be avoided entirely (under the current 
doctrine) simply through encryption.66 Concerns about over-deterrence, or 
excessive investment in precautions, are minimized (if not eliminated) 
where the entity can avoid liability relatively simply and cheaply, and 
where errors in adjudication are unlikely. When a rule is effective, both 
initially and over time, and where regulators can assess compliance cheaply 
and with confidence, a rule is likely to be superior to a standard in 
specifying technological measures for data security. Thus, data security 
rules can helpfully act as a forcing device that reduces the level of harm 
from breaches. 
One example of a data security rule that appears beneficial (though it is 
sufficiently new that empirical data is lacking) is the data breach 
notification scheme added to HIPAA (the federal Health Insurance 
Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, which set data privacy and 
security rules for personally-identifiable health information) by the 
HITECH Act of 2009.67 The HITECH Act regulates information security 
indirectly: if a covered entity under HIPAA has a breach of “unsecured 
protected health information,” that entity must inform people whose data 
was released and, in the case of a breach affecting more than 500 people, 
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must also inform the news media.68 Unsecured protected health information 
(PHI) is PHI that is neither encrypted or destroyed.69 Thus, a breach of 
encrypted data does not impose a notification requirement, while a breach 
of unencrypted PHI does. The HITECH Act is specific about the encryption 
technologies that meet its mandate, pointing covered entities to a list of 
methods certified by the National Institute of Standards and Technology 
(NIST).70 Examples of NIST-approved encryption methods include the use 
of Transport Layer Security (TLS), SSL, or IPSec for data communications, 
and the NTFS file system for data storage.71 The new HIPAA data security 
mandate acts like a rule: there is a bright-line test for compliance—either 
PHI is encrypted with an approved method, or it is treated as unsecured—
and the consequences of non-compliance are clear—the entity assumes 
responsibility for notification in case of a data breach. While the mandate is 
a soft one—covered entities need not comply if they are willing to notify if 
a breach occurs—it is nonetheless structured as a rule. The HITECH 
requirement meets all three conditions specified above. First, encryption is 
sufficient to mitigate or prevent most harms; second, the NIST-specified 
standards are relatively slow to decay; and third, compliance is easy to 
measure—either data is encrypted or it is not.72 
Even if a rule risks being under-protective, such as where it decays 
relatively quickly in efficacy (potentially violating the second condition 
outlined above), it may still be valuable, especially if paired or reinforced 
by a standard. This is likely to be true where technological changes are not 
rapid enough to call for a standard, but are faster than, for example, the 
changes in encryption effectiveness described above. For example, security 
regulation could employ a rule specifying encryption with a 256-bit 
symmetric key algorithm, and a standard requiring stronger encryption 
where industry best practices so indicate. Such a move incorporates both 
strict liability—failure to utilize 256-bit or greater encryption creates per se 
liability—and negligence-based analysis—failure to use stronger encryption 
when one’s industry does so can create liability. This hybrid approach 
increases compliance costs, as potentially liable entities must engage in 
additional investigation to determine the standard of care, and also 
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monitoring costs, as enforcers must perform the same task.73 However, it 
can usefully augment a bright-line rule where there are significant concerns 
that the rule may become under-protective. 
This framework suggests, by way of example, three areas where rule-
based regulation will be helpful: data storage, data transport, and access 
logging. 
Both data storage and data transport can be governed by a simple rule: 
encrypt. Data encryption technology is ubiquitous, inexpensive, and 
reliable, yet the wave of data spills suggests that data owners and 
distributors have insufficient incentives to employ it.74 A rule requiring 
entities to encrypt data during storage and transport, on pain of facing 
liability for all harms resulting from breaches or spills, would usefully 
create incentives for protection and would also drive ineffective or 
incompetent data handlers from the market. Typical concerns about over-
deterrence do not apply where compliance is relatively low-cost and where 
errors in evaluating it are rare if not absent entirely. Encryption for storage 
and transport meets the three preconditions this Article posits for rules. 
First, encrypting data when it is stored or sent should protect against misuse 
in most circumstances.75 While sophisticated adversaries can decrypt 
protected information, doing so requires time, technology, and resources. 
Encryption raises the cost of data misuse, even if it does not affect the 
likelihood of data spills. Second, a rule requiring encryption is relatively 
obsolescence-proof. While faster GPUs and CPUs are decreasing the time 
necessary to decrypt data without authorization, current protocols are likely 
to be sufficient for at least ten years.76 Finally, detection is cheap and easy. 
Encryption can be verified through visual inspection. Moreover, given that 
encryption is strong protection against data misuse, courts might even adopt 
a presumption that misused data was, in fact, not protected. Res ipsa 
loquitur is a traditional cost-saving enforcement mechanism that could also 
helpfully force regulated entities to verify encryption or to enable it by 
default.77 
Access logging—tracking who has accessed, changed, or deleted 
data—is also a strong candidate for rule-based regulation.78 Moreover, 
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access monitoring is an example of a mitigation effort rather than a 
prevention effort; recording who has access to data does not impede 
copying or misuse directly, but can deter attackers and can also make clean-
up efforts easier and more effective.79 A rule for access logging could be 
quite specific, mandating that entities capture the user credentials, time of 
access or alteration, and location of access or alteration in durable form. In 
addition, the rule could allow some flexibility—become more standard-
like—by prescribing what must be captured, when, and how, but not by 
mandating a particular mode of access control. For example, specifying that 
a system of electronic medical records must record what records are 
accessed, what changes are made, by whom (user name, for example), from 
where (IP address or computer host name, for example), and when, would 
provide a clear trail that would enable recovery efforts after a data spill. 
Access logging also meets this Article’s three preconditions. Knowing 
who—or, at least, whose credentials—accessed the data is helpful to 
divining downstream data access after a breach; thus, even minimal 
tracking is quite effective.80 Second, access logging has changed relatively 
little since the days of mainframe data storage; users still authenticate via 
credentials such as names and passwords.81 Even access controls that 
employ digital signatures or keys are only variants on this basic technique. 
Finally, verifying compliance is straightforward: either the entity keeps logs 
of access, or it does not. Protective techniques such as checksums and 
hashes can easily test for ex post alteration of access logging, preventing 
malefactors from obscuring evidence.82 Thus, not only is access logging 
usefully regulated by a rule, but it also serves as an example of a necessary 
shift in regulatory focus: from prevention to mitigation. 
As these examples demonstrate, regulation by rule has considerable 
virtues for technology, at least where the technology has effective minima, 
slow decay, and easy verification. 
CONCLUSION 
The default assumption for regulating information technology is that 
standards are not only the superior choice; they are nearly the only choice. 
This is because scholars and policymakers have focused on the wrong 
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problem: they seek to prevent data spills, rather than to mitigate their 
impact. Rules can helpfully reduce the effects of a breach. For technology, 
rules are preferable when they can specify a minimum level of protection 
that is relatively effective against most risks or attacks; where obsolescence 
occurs slowly; and where monitoring the rule’s implementation is relatively 
low-cost and accurate.83 Standards are not always superior, nor are they 
always inferior—instead, the preferred embodiment of regulation varies 
with the characteristics of the technological problem at issue. While 
application design is best governed by standards, due to the critical role of 
process, the transport and storage of data, along with identification of 
access to information, are best dealt with via rules.84 This Article questions 
the prevailing consensus in favor of standards for regulating technology, 
and also seeks to create testable predictions about when rules will work 
better. In short, I argue sometimes geeks require rules, not standards. 
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